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We are justified in giving a distinct fallacy label to a type of defective argument
only if we can identify some clear cases of that argument, and show that it is
defective in a way that is distinct from other fallacies. Prof. Gough argues that it
is difficult to satisfy these two necessary conditions in the case of the fallacy of
an appeals to tradition. I will argue that despite some of these difficulties, some
fallacious appeals to tradition do satisfy these conditions. I will first present a
few paradigm cases of appeals to tradition, describe what seems to be their
general form, show why in some cases these arguments are either sound or
unsound, and then comment on Prof. Gough's arguments. In this paper I
provisionally define "tradition" as a group of beliefs or habits that have given
either meaning or direction to a group of people, and that have been handed
down for at least a few generations. Given this definition, there can be
religious, educational, scientific, military, monastic, domestic, artistic, etc.
traditions.
I take the following examples to be model cases of the kinds of arguments that
are labeled appeals to tradition:
(1) Women should stay in the home because that's the way it has always been.
(2) "Ask five people at a cocktail party how they feel about astrology, the study
of Tarot cards, or the Oracle of Changes: I-Ching, and you're likely to get
responses ranging from 'fun' and 'fascinating' to 'hokey' and 'suspicious'.
However you look at it, these divining tools have stood the test of time, and of
late have come to reside online in the software for Macintosh." ("A Primer on
Divining", Anne Marie Feld, MacHome, May 1999, p. 52, my italics.)
(3) Whenever someone has ailment x, s/he should do y, for that is how it was
treated in the past.
(4) Whenever someone transgresses rule z of our tribe, s/he should be
banished because that's the way it was done ever since the remote past.
These model examples illustrate the following difficulties we can have with
these arguments. First, such arguments typically do not appeal to a whole
tradition but rather to the a belief or practice within a tradition. Secondly, it is
sometimes not clear which tradition transmits a belief or a practice. Thirdly, it is
often not clear whether there is in fact a tradition that transmits them. Fourthly,
the word "tradition" is sometimes used even in cases where it is only the age
of a belief, habit, or custom that is intended to provide the support of a
conclusion. These problems suggest that the expression, "appeal to tradition",
might not be the best label to group the kind of fallacy we are discussing.
Despite these problems, the model cases suggest the following general forms:
(A) (1) The belief that X is very old, or
(My ancestors believed that X, or
My elders taught me to believe that X, and
they acquired it from their elders, etc., or
Belief X is part of a tradition to which I belong), or ...)
So, (C1) X is true (argument), or
(C2) one is justified in believing that X (argument), or
(C3) one should believe that X (argument), or
(C4) now it is understood why one believes that X (explanation).
(B) (1) Practice/habit/custom Y is very old, or
(My ancestors did/practiced Y, or
My elders taught me to do Y, and
they acquired it from their elders, etc., or
The practice of Y is part of a tradition (to which one belongs), or…)
So, (C1) practice/habit/custom Y is justified (argument), or
(C2) one should practice Y (argument), or
(C3) now it is understood why one does Y (explanation).
I certainly do not pretend to have identified all the possible different groups of
model cases of appeals to tradition that would suggest a form different from
the one I have just described, but this will suffice for my present purposes. I
describe different ways of expressing premise (1), and identify variations in the
kinds of conclusions inferred from the premise. For one could be either
attempting to convince one's audience that a belief is true, or justified, or
should be believed, or trying to explain why one holds a belief. These
distinctions are important because the appeal to tradition can sometimes
establish one conclusion but not the others. (I do not pretend to have identified
all possible variations of the kinds of conclusion supported by an appeal to
tradition, and here too I invite you to add to the list.) I will focus my attention on
the attempt to derive conclusion C(1). For the sake of brevity I will concentrate
mainly on argument (A) because most of what I will say also applies with some
minor modifications to arguments (B).
Argument (A) is fallacious because it makes an irrelevant appeal to time. The
greater age of a premise is supposed to increase its support for a conclusion.
If this were so, then there would be different degrees of support in the following
arguments:
(C) (1) Venus and Earth revolve around the Sun.
So, (2) there is at least one planet in addition to Earth that revolves around the
Sun.
(D) (1) Pluto and Earth revolve around the Sun.
So, (2) there is at least one planet in addition to Earth that revolves around the
Sun.
Both beliefs C(1) and D(1) are true, C(1) is older than D(1) because C(1) was
discovered much earlier than D(1). But both arguments provide an equal
amount of support. Therefore, the age of a belief does not increase the support
it already brings to a conclusion. Just as the greater age of a person does not
entail that s/he has greater knowledge or wisdom, the greater age of a belief or
tradition does not entail that it provides better support.
Of course the age of a belief has no relevance to its truth. For there are many
false beliefs that are older than their contradictories. For example, the false
belief that the Earth is flat is older than the true belief that the Earth is not flat.
Hence, when contrasting two beliefs, the greater age of a belief is not sufficient
for its truth. Similarly, there are many true beliefs that are not older than their
contradictories. For example, the true belief that the Earth is spherical is not
older than the false belief that the Earth is not spherical. Thus, when contrasting
two beliefs, a greater age of a belief is not necessary for its truth.
The age of an argument is also logically irrelevant. If it were relevant, then there
would be a logically significant difference between a sound argument
completed a century ago and an identical argument completed just a moment
ago. Of course the historical context helps us to interpret an argument, and
different historical consequences arise from the different times when an
argument is constructed. However, if two arguments in fact express what they
are intended to communicate, and if they both express the same thing, then the
age difference between them is logically irrelevant.
The time involved in generating an argument (or deriving a proof) is also
irrelevant, even though it is a process that elapses through time. For if the
lapse of time were relevant, then there would be a logically significant
difference between an instantaneously constructed sound argument and an
identical argument that takes a century to construct. Though there are different
practical consequences between these two arguments, there are no logically
significant differences between them. Therefore, the span of time involved in
the construction of an argument is logically irrelevant.
In conclusion, the age of a belief has no bearing on the support it provides nor
on its truth, and the age of an argument and the time it takes to construct it
have no bearing on the strength of the argument. From these four points,
especially the first two, whenever one intends to support the truth of a belief that
X only from the age of X, or only from the age of the evidence in favor of X,
then that appeal commits a fallacy of relevance. If the reasoning is the
preceding paragraphs is sound, one can answer positively to Prof. Gough's
question in his title: "Does Any Appeal to Tradition Rest on Mistaken
Reasoning?".
The use of the label, "appeal to tradition" is supported for at least two reasons.
First, this fallacy of relevance is clearly distinct for other fallacies of relevance.
Secondly, there are many different ways of making an irrelevant appeal to
time/age, and so, this label helps us to focus specifically where a defect lies.
However, let us not forget that the problems mentioned in the third paragraph
of the this paper suggest that "tradition" is not the best word to guide the
focusing.
Prof. Gough's question can be interpreted as inviting us to examine whether
arguments that have the appearance of appeals to tradition can be legitimate.
Though he does not pursue the matter, it could shed further light on the issue at
hand. In the next part of this paper I will describe such arguments. I will first
identify the assumptions required by a legitimate use of such claims as, (E)
"Belief/claim X has stood the test of time", and those required by such
arguments as (A); and then describe the consequences that follow from this
discussion.
Since time evidently does not do any testing whatsoever, the statement that a
belief X has stood the test of time is obviously false, and so no reasonable
person interprets that statement literally. What is probably assumed is that X
has stood (a) many test, in the broad sense of the word "test". Since it usually
takes time to test and verify something, the reference to time seems to be an
indirect way referring to a large quantity of tests. However, this is not sufficient
for the truth of X: it must also be assumed that X has stood (a) many (b)
appropriate tests. Condition (b) is often not satisfied, and this is why the use of
such statements as (E) as evidence is fallacious. However, if conditions (a)
and (b) are satisfied, then the use of statements like "Belief X has stood the
test of time" as evidence does not involve any fallacious reasoning, even
though such statements are not effective ways of communicating all the
relevant assumptions that are doing the work.
There are similar important assumptions underlying argument (A). As
presented, this argument is certainly invalid, for there are many
counterexamples where all its premises are true and the conclusion false. A
correct reconstruction of the argument will identify the implicit assumptions that
block such counterexamples.
A person who does not mistakenly assume that the age of a premise (or
tradition) increases its support, will usually appeal to the transmission of a
belief within a tradition by making the following kind of assumption:
(A) (2) Belief X was and still is justified within the tradition.
However, conjoining (A)(2) to (A)(1) is still not enough to establish the truth of
the conclusion. For what was and still is justified within a tradition might not
be acceptable to those who do not adhere to the traditions that transmits
belief X. In order to block such objections, an appeal tradition intended to
establish the truth across traditions must make assumptions similar to the
following:
(A) (3) The justification of X within the tradition in question is sufficient to
establish the truth of X .
A weaker version of this assumption is that
(A) (3') The justification of X within the tradition is adequate and acceptable to
the audience of the argument.
There can be variation on this assumption:
(A) (3'') Belief X has stood (the appropriate, and sufficient number of) test "of
time" across the relevant traditions.
Though the insertion of (A)(2) and (A)(3) renders (A) valid, one could object to
this reconstruction on the grounds that the added assumptions render the given
premise superfluous. Similarly, exposing the assumptions required by claim
(E), belief X has stood the test of time, renders (E) irrelevant. Is this a defect of
the reconstruction, or is the reconstruction evidence that statements such as
A(1) and (E) are really logically irrelevant? Just as a statement expressing an
appeal to authority in support of a claim X is not what is actually providing the
support but merely points in the direction of what is thought to provide support,
statements that have the appearance of appealing to a tradition do not provide
support but vaguely point in the direction of support. This kind of "appeal to
tradition" to support X, just as an appeal to authority to support X, is a way of
calling attention to what does the real work to support X. Statements A(1) and
(E) can be just calling attention to where the real work is done, but they
themselves do not provide any support. Consequently, a correct reconstruction
of arguments that have the appearance of appealing to a tradition, used to
support the truth of X, would unavoidably expose the premise expressing the
appeal as being logically irrelevant in supporting the truth of X.
One consequence follows if my description of certain so-called "appeals to
tradition" is accurate. Consider the many traditions in the arts, sciences,
humanities, engineering, trades, and crafts where many ideas and practices
have been subject to many appropriate tests that are acceptable across many
disciplines. Since there are many cases where these tacit assumptions are
true, it follows that there are many legitimate arguments that misleadingly
appear to commit a fallacious appeal to a tradition.
The use of these arguments are rather precarious. For it is not clear whether
an author is using the appeal to tradition as a way of referring to the
appropriate assumptions that are doing the real work, or whether s/he is
mistakenly assuming that the age of a premise increases its support.
In the third and final part of my paper I will focus my attention on some of
Professor Jim Gough's arguments. He ends his paper with the conclusion that
"at the very least, it is not obvious that any appeal to tradition even in an
argument is necessarily fallacious" (my italics). I have already identified in the
first part of my paper some conditions where such an appeal is fallacious, but I
have also shown in the second part how some arguments that have the surface
features of appealing to tradition are in fact good arguments.
In one of his arguments he examines two examples in which he identifies
serious faults "without applying any evaluation based on an appeal to the
fallacy of tradition". He then draws two conclusions: (1) "this gives us some
reason to believe that an appeal to the fallacy of tradition may be
unnecessary", and (2) "superfluous".
The first problem with this argument is that the very same reasoning shows that
the other defects "may be" just as unnecessary and superfluous. For one could
identify the fallacious appeal to tradition without applying any evaluation based
on those other defects.
The second problem is that there is a need for some clarification here. The
fallacy of tradition may be unnecessary for what? or superfluous to what end?
Even if it is not necessary to expose a fallacious appeal to tradition in order to
reject an argument because some other defect is sufficient for that rejection,
this simply makes the fallacy of appeal to tradition unnecessary or superfluous
from a practical point of view, it does show that the fallacy is logically irrelevant.
Another argument against the use of fallacy of appeal to tradition is that "Often
the appeal to tradition is an appeal to an unquestionable authority - one that is
in principle, not open to being questioned". This interpretation leads him to say
that such a fallacy is either an appeal to an irrelevant authority or to irrelevant
emotions. Such a conclusion arises from limiting one’s attention to only the
surface features of arguments that have the appearance of appealing to
tradition. We can see this from the kind of examples he uses to argue that
appeals to the "past, wisdom from the past" or customs do not distinguish such
arguments from "many other appeals to authority":
(1) Reductionism ignores matters that have been held important by
responsible thinkers.
(2) Reductionism ignores matters that have been held important by
generations of responsible thinkers. [my italics]
The second statement is according to Prof. Gough as an example of an appeal
to tradition. However, the surface features of (2) render it ambiguous. They are
not enough to determine whether (2) is a genuine appeal to tradition, where the
age of a premise or belief increases its support, as I have described it in the
first part of my paper, or whether the temporal aspects of (2) are just a way of
referring to a greater number of authorities, thereby making (2) an appeal to
authority. And such ambiguity only shows that the appeals to tradition are
sometimes (or perhaps often) misleading: it does not show that there are no
authentic (and therefore fallacious) appeals to tradition. If we focus on just one
side of the ambiguity, we can interpret all or most appeals to tradition as
appeals to authority. But such a move already assumes that there are no
genuine appeals to tradition.
There is a mistake in the section where he discusses certain definitions.
Though he correctly shows "some of these definitions refer to mistakes in
reasoning that have other designations", and that "these definitions do not
refer to anything that one could uniquely identify as a fallacious appeal to
tradition", it does not follow from these defective definitions that there is no
good definition, or that there cannot be a good one, that does uniquely identify
a fallacious appeal to tradition.
There are also difficulties with his appeal to audience variances: "audience
variance leaves all uses of the irrelevant appeal to tradition open to question
since whether an appeal is irrelevant is itself relevant to a particular audience
with a predisposition" favoring a tradition. However the same reason applies
to any accusation that someone has committed any other fallacy: anyone
favoring what is labeled as being fallacious will similarly question the relevance
of the reasoning leading to the conclusion that a fallacy has been committed.
Since audience variance applies to any fallacy, including appeals to authority,
this argument cannot be used to discredit the fallacy of appeal to tradition while
favoring the fallacy of appeals to authority.
Professor Gough's discussion of the "tradition paradox" does not seem
relevant to his final conclusion. He is certainly correct in saying that there is
psychological resistance to changing a tradition even when it is an
improvement of the tradition, and that "the force of relevance rests with the
existing or traditional practice of the proposed alternative". That psychological
resistance has no bearing on the logical objections against a tradition. He
himself makes a similar point: "the endurance of certain patterns of behavior or
practices over time can make a positive difference to their cognitive or
psychological acceptance while making little or no difference to their logical
necessity or acceptance".
The relevance of his telos/process distinction is not very clear. First,
traditionalists take for granted that their tradition is an appropriate means for a
goal. So why associate "process" only to the critics of the tradition? Secondly,
the critics object to a tradition typically because it is not effective in reaching
some important goal. So why associate "telos" only to the traditionalist?
In the first part of this paper I presented a few model cases from which I
identified a general form of one kind of appeal to tradition, and then showed
why such forms are fallacious. In the second part I described how legitimate
arguments can misleadingly appeal to tradition, and identified some
assumptions that are necessary for such arguments to be sound. These two
parts helped me to answer partly Prof. Gough's question, "Does Any Appeal to
Tradition Rest on Mistaken Reasoning?". In the final part I discussed some of
his arguments and offered some suggestions for his continuing work on the
fallacy of appeals to tradition.
 
